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I. INTRODUCTION
Spectrum is a public resource that supports a variety of uses. A prin-
cipal statutory responsibility of the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC or Commission) is to maintain authority and control over spectrum
in order to ensure that the spectrum is utilized for the benefit of all the na-
tion's citizens and in a manner that serves the national defense and pro-
motes the safety of life and property.' In recent years, this function has
taken on increasing urgency and difficulty as technological, economic, and
legal developments have increased both the demand for spectrum and the
amount of usable spectrum within the Commission's jurisdiction. Fur-
thermore, the Commission now has statutory authority to assign spectrum
through the use of competitive bidding in many circumstances, thereby in-
creasing its ability to rely on market forces to attain the best use of spec-
trum for the benefit of consumers.2 Given these developments, it is timely
to consider the Commission's overall spectrum policy objectives and how
those objectives can best be promoted using the tools available to the
Commission.
In this Article, the authors propose a series of principles and ideas
that we believe should inform the Commission's future decisions regard-
ing spectrum policy. As elaborated below, we believe the Commission
should continue and expand upon the initiatives it has already taken to
adopt spectrum policies that promote competition, allow maximum flexi-
bility, encourage technical efficiency, promote innovation, facilitate
seamless networks, and maximize the amount of spectrum available for
use. In this way, the Commission can attempt to ensure that spectrum will
be used to provide the greatest benefit to the public.
This Article is intended to stimulate discussion and critical comment
both within and outside the Commission, with the ultimate goal of helping
the Commission, spectrum users, the consuming public, and other inter-
ested parties to address current and future spectrum policy questions in the
manner that best promotes the public interest.
II. BACKGROUND
A principal reason that Congress established the Commission more
than sixty years ago was to manage the radio spectrum so that the public
1. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, §§ 151, 301, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as
amended at47 U.S.C.A. §§ 151, 301 (West Supp. 1997)).
2. 47 U.S.C.A. § 309(j).
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3
could receive maximum benefit from its use. Prior to 1927, licenses to use
radio spectrum were granted by the secretary of commerce, who also had
the power to designate frequencies for particular radio services. The courts
held, however, that the secretary of commerce did not have the authority to
deny licenses on the ground that they would cause interference, nor to limitS4
licensees' power, frequency, or hours of operation. As a result, the air-
waves became filled with interfering signals, severely compromising the
ability of any spectrum user to make use of the spectrum.5 To remedy this
situation, Congress enacted the Radio Act of 1927,6 the substantive provi-
sions of which were later incorporated into the Communications Act of
1934,7 which established the Commission. Under the Communications
Act, the Commission has broad authority, consistent with the public inter-
est, convenience, and necessity, to license users of radio spectrum; impose
conditions on their licenses; prescribe the nature of the services to be ren-
dered by stations or classes of stations; and prevent interference with li-
censees' authorized uses of spectrum.8
In 1945, the Commission articulated a series of principles that guidedS• 9
its early spectrum allocation decisions. These principles reflected a para-
digm under which the Commission actively determined the best use for
each block of spectrum and assigned spectrum according to specific crite-
ria. Thus, in determining which of several services would be permitted to
operate over a particular frequency band, the Commission sought to evalu-
ate whether any service would be better provided over wireline telecom-
munications facilities, which services were most important, how many
people would benefit from each service, and which services would be most
3. See generally National Brdcst. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 210-14 (1943)
(explaining the necessity of regulation of radio communication).
4. See United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 12 F.2d 614 (N.D. Ill. 1926); Hoover v. In-
tercity Radio Co., 286 F. 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1923), appeal dismissed per stipulation, 266 U.S.
636 (1924).
5. Thomas W. Hazlett, The Rationality of U.S. Regulation of the Broadcast Spectrum,
33 J. L. & ECON. 133 (1990).
6. Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162, repealed by Communications Act of 1934,
ch. 652, § 602(a), 48 Stat. 1064, 1102.
7. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat 1064 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 47 U.S.C. (1994)).
8. 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 301-303 (West Supp. 1997). The Commission's authority does not
extend to stations owned and operated by the United States, except that it shall prescribe spe-
cial call letters for such stations and that such stations shall conform to its rules designed to
prevent interference when transmitting communications or signals not relating to government
business. See id. § 305.
9. See Allocation of Frequencies to the Various Classes of Non-Govtl. Servs. in the Ra-
dio Spectrum from 10 Kilocycles to 30,000,000 Kilocycles, Docket No. 6651, Report, at 18-20
(Jan. 15, 1945).
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accepted by the public. In addition, the Commission considered the propa-
gation characteristics of different frequencies, as well as the extent to
which the industry and the public had already invested in equipment to use
particular frequencies for specific services.
As a result of developments in technology, new services, such as
two-way switched mobile voice communications, have become available
that were barely imagined in 1945. Unlicensed devices, such as cordless
phones and garage door openers, have proliferated. Global satellite sys-
tems that require an unprecedented level of international coordination are
being offered. Technology has enabled services to be offered over progres-
sively higher frequencies that were once thought to be unusable. On the
one hand, digital and other technologies have made it possible to offer
some services using ever narrower bandwidths, while on the other hand,
new services are envisioned that require increasingly wide bandwidths.
Spread spectrum technology has raised the possibility of several users, or
even several services, independently sharing wide frequency bands without
interference. Furthermore, technology and the market will continue to de-
velop rapidly for the foreseeable future in ways that cannot reliably be
predicted. The Commission's current spectrum policy decisions therefore
should incorporate sufficient flexibility so as not to constrain these future
developments or favor particular technologies.
Over the years, the Commission has recognized that its previously
articulated principles are no longer adequate to guide spectrum policy, and
it has moved away from the philosophy implicit in those principles toward
an approach that is more attuned to the operation of market forces. In par-
ticular, the Commission has relied less on administrative efforts to deter-
mine the best uses of spectrum. Instead, it has allowed service providers
increased flexibility to respond to incentives communicated by the mar-
ketplace for the efficient production of diverse services that consumers
want and need. The Commission should make clear that it will follow this
approach in a consistent manner and resist pressure from those who urge
the Commision to restrict market forces in order to protect their private
interests rather than to promote the public interest. The Commission has
also sought and obtained the legal authority to award licenses by competi-
tive bidding, and it has used that authority to assign licenses in an efficient,
market-based manner. Additionally, on March 5, 1996, the Commission
convened an en banc hearing to address spectrum policy issues. At that
hearing, four panels of experts offered testimony regarding future spec-
trum demand, technology trends, spectrum allocation, and spectrum as-
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signment.' ° Finally, we should note that many of the proposals discussed in
this Article reflect and extend ideas developed in prior research by Com-
mission staff."
IH. DIsCUSSION
The radio spectrum is a valuable natural resource with unique char-
acteristics. Spectrum may be used more or less efficiently, but it cannot be
created or destroyed. Unlike many natural resources, spectrum is inex-
haustible over time; the manner or degree to which spectrum is used at one
moment has no physical impact on the availability of spectrum at any other
moment. At any given time and location, however, the amount of usable
spectrum is finite. Thus, any use of spectrum necessarily precludes or af-
fects, to a greater or lesser degree, some other simultaneous use of the
same spectrum. There is no known means by which spectrum can be made
infinitely available to all who may wish to use it.
Pursuant to the Communications Act, the Commission's overriding
mandate is to promote the public interest. 2 In order to achieve this end,
Congress has made clear that the United States shall maintain control over
spectrum within the nation's jurisdiction, and that a license to use spec-
trum shall not constitute ownership of that spectrum.13 We believe the
public interest is best served by ensuring that the American people receive
the maximum benefit from the spectrum resource. Therefore, the Commis-
sion's spectrum policy should advance the goal of ensuring that the full
benefit of the spectrum resource accrues to the public and the goal of
achieving the most beneficial uses of spectrum.
The public may benefit from the use of spectrum in a variety of ways.
One form of benefit occurs when government agencies maintain control
over spectrum and use it for public purposes, such as national defense or
10. See Transcript, En Banc Hearing on Spectrum Policy Before the FCC (Mar. 5, 1996)
<http://www.fcc.govlReports/enbanc-spectrum.rpt.txt> [hereinafter Transcript]. Written
comments and reply comments were also filed (on file with authors) [hereinafter Comments].
11. See DOUGLAS W. WEBINK, FREQUENCY SPECrRUM DEREGULATION ALTERNATIVES
(Office of Plans and Policy Working Paper No. 2, 1980); EVAN R. KwEREL & ALEX D.
FELKER, USING AUCnONs TO SELECT FCC LICENSEEs (Office of Plans and Policy Working Pa-
per No. 16, 1985); EVAN R. KWEREL & JOHN R. WiLLAMs, CHANGING CHANNELS: VOL-
UNTARY REALLOCATION OF UHF TELEIION SPECTRUM (Office of Plans and Policy Working
Paper No. 27, 1992); DAVID P. REED, PUTnING IT ALL TOGETHER: THE COST STRUCTURE OF
PERSONAL COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES (Office of Plans and Policy Working Paper No. 28,
1992); EvAN R. KWEREL & JOHN R. WLIAMS, MOVING TOWARD A MARKET FOR SPECTRUM,
1993 REr. 2, 53 (1993); Reed Hundt & Gregory L. Rosston, Spectrum Flexibility Will Pro-
mote Competition and the Public Interest, IEEE COMM. MAG. 40 (Dec. 1995).
12. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 151, 302(a), 303, 309(a).
13. Id. § 301.
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public safety. The public may also benefit when private users of spectrum
are required to use that spectrum in ways that serve the public interest.
14
While these uses may yield public benefits, these benefits may be lower
than the benefits to be achieved from treating spectrum like other inputs in
the provision of public and private services. As discussed below, mandated
use in general may ultimately diminish the public welfare by preventing
market forces from operating to yield the most valued services at efficient
cost and competitive prices. 5 We therefore believe that in most cases, the
Commission can best promote the public interest by relying on competitive
market forces and by implementing allocation, assignment, usage, and
other policies that permit market forces to operate most effectively.
We believe that a well-conceived conceptual framework can make it
easier for the Commission to reach sound, consistent, procompetitive
spectrum policy decisions that maximize the public interest. If the Com-
mission can establish a clear and consistent paradigm for approaching
these issues, it will provide guidance and increased certainty to the market,
thereby encouraging investment in new technology. This Article is in-
tended to assist the Commission in developing such a paradigm.
A. Competitive Markets
In general, the public derives the greatest benefit from spectrum
when the spectrum is used for services that the public values most highly
and therefore is most willing to pay for. No government agency, however,
can reliably predict public demand for specific services or the future di-
rection of new technologies. Even if technology and the public's needs
were unchanging, a central planner could only imprecisely evaluate the
benefits of the myriad possible uses of spectrum and determine which fre-
quencies should be used for each service. Given the rapid evolution of
technology, moreover, the Commission cannot reliably predict what serv-
ices will be available or which frequency range will be efficient for any
service even a few years from now, much less what the public demand for
each service will be and how to respond to changing demand. Therefore,
even if the Commission could correctly identify the most economically ef-
ficient use of spectrum at any given time, it would be obliged continually
to modify its allocations to reflect technological and economic develop-
ments. This reallocation process necessarily consumes substantial public
and private resources, reduces certainty for users of spectrum, discourages
investment, and delays the introduction of new services. This process also
14. See infra Part EI.C.
15. See infra Part lI.A.
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discourages innovation because it requires entrepreneurs to disclose their
ideas to the public well in advance of their introduction, severely dimin-
ishing the competitive advantage from being first to market.
In recognition of these shortcomings of central planning, we believe
the Commission should, wherever possible, rely on market forces to ensure
economically efficient use of spectrum. In a perfectly competitive market,
firms will produce the combination of goods and services most desired by
consumers in the most efficient manner, and will offer these goods and
services at competitive prices. In this way, the market achieves technologi-
cal and allocative efficiency.16 Furthermore, entrepreneurs have an incen-
tive to enter into, where feasible, production of goods and services that
have been provided on a less than fully competitive basis, since these
products tend to offer the greatest opportunities for profits. Thus, if rea-
sonably competitive conditions exist and significant market failures do not
occur, the market achieves economically efficient use of resources more
quickly and more reliably than government regulation.
The Commission's spectrum policies, therefore, should both permit
and promote the operation of competitive market forces. In large part, the
Commission can serve these principles simply by not interfering where it
concludes that the judgment of the marketplace is sufficiently reliable.
Thus, except in instances of substantial market failure or overriding public
interest considerations, the Commission should avoid mandating that
spectrum be used to provide specific services (e.g., two-way switched mo-
bile voice, paging, or dispatch).17 The Commission should also endeavor to
minimize regulations governing how services may be provided, which
limit competition, obstruct innovation, and impede efficient investment, as
discussed more fully below.
In addition to avoiding regulations that impede competition, the
Commission should also affirmatively orient its policies, where possible,
to create the conditions under which market forces can most effectively
work. This principle should guide the Commission's practices both in allo-
cating spectrum and in assigning it to particular users. Thus, in allocating
spectrum, the Commission should strive to ensure that ample spectrum is
available for services that the public demands. In addition, where spectrum
is currently governed by rules that do not permit it to be used to its full
value, the Commission should act quickly and effectively to expand serv-
ice flexibility so that this spectrum can be used more efficiently, thereby
16. See TIOR ScrrovsKy, WELFARE AND COMPEITION (1971); DAvID W. PEARCE, THE
DICIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS 13-14 (1981).
17. See infra Part BI.B.
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increasing the value of spectrum to licensees and the public."8 Where pos-
sible, the Commission should also exhaustively license spectrum in bands
that are now licensed on a site-by-site basis by issuing flexible, geo-
graphic-area overlay licenses and creating mechanisms for voluntary
changes in spectrum use, including, where appropriate, procedures for
new, geographic-area licensees and incumbents to negotiate compensated
relocation of incumbents. 19
The Commission should also be wary of unnecessarily reserving
spectrum for future use. In most instances, the public is probably better
served if spectrum is made available for use and that use is allowed to
change as technological and market developments warrant, rather than if
the Commission withholds spectrum from use indefinitely. The Commis-
sion should therefore make available for assignment any remaining large
blocks of unassigned spectrum, and it should move quickly to reallocate
spectrum to private sector use as it continues to receive authority over
spectrum formerly reserved for the federal government. Moreover, to the
extent that the best use for spectrum in some circumstances is for it to lie
temporarily fallow, we believe that the competitive market can reliably
identify those situations. Therefore, we believe the best practice ordinarily
is for the Commission to allocate and assign spectrum, and to allow suffi-
cient flexibility so that spectrum users may hold spectrum in reserve if
they determine that to be the highest valued use of the spectrum.20 That
18. See infra Part II.B.
19. For example, in the early 1990s the Commission created usable spectrum for personal
communications services by establishing procedures for band sharing or negotiated relocation
of fixed microwave incumbents. See Redevelopment of Spectrum to Encourage Innovation in
the Use of New Telecomm. Tech., First Report and Order and Third Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 7 FCC Rcd. 6886, 71 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 349 (1992), reconsidered in part by
Second Report and Order, 8 FCC Rcd. 6495, 73 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 777 (1993), modified by
Third Report and Order and Memorandum Opinion and Order, 8 FCC Rcd. 6589, 73 Rad.
Reg. 2d (P & F) 766 (1993), reconsidered by Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9 FCC Rcd.
1943, 74 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1042 (1994), modified in part by Second Memorandum Opin-
ion and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. 7797, 76 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1043 (1994), considered in Asso-
ciation of Public-Safety Comm. Officials-Int'l, Inc. v. FCC, 76 F.3d 395 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Al-
though this is an example of a successful and necessary reallocation, future similar adjustments
should ideally be accomplished more quickly and efficiently. See, e.g., Transcript, supra note
10, at 17 (statement of Susan Mayer, MCI Telecommunications Corp.), 63-64 (statement of
Tom Hazlett, American Enterprise Institute), 82-83 (statements of Peter Murray, UTAM, Inc.
and Wireless Information Networks Forum, and Susan Mayer), 163-64 (statement of Charles
Jackson, Strategic Policy Research) (explaining that auction results may help indicate where
reallocation is appropriate); Peter Cramton, Evan R. Kwerel & John R. Williams, Efficient
Relocation of Spectrum Incumbents, Paper presented at the Telecommunications Policy Re-
search Conference, Solomons, Maryland (1996) (on file with authors).
20. Withholding service from a competitive market may be efficient, for example, if the
licensee thinks a better technology may soon be available, just as some real property owners
hold a vacant lot for several years before developing the property. So long as the licensee real-
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means that the Commission should refrain from imposing inefficient con-
struction requirements in order to prevent anticompetitive warehousing or
to achieve build-out to rural areas. Construction requirements do not nec-
essarily solve these problems because licensees can typically satisfy such
requirements without providing the service at issue, and they impose inef-
ficiencies in the use of spectrum.
2
'
The Commission can also help promote economically efficient use of
spectrum by establishing the initial geographic scope and bandwidth of li-
censes in a manner that is sensitive to the different characteristics of dif-
ferent frequencies, as well as the different spectrum needs of various serv-
ices. In general, the Commission should set initial allocations to
approximate its estimate of the efficient use of spectrum. Because of trans-
action costs, sensible initial allocations are important to quickly achieving
efficient spectrum use. For example, in order to afford potential providers
wishing to offer services that require large bandwidths an opportunity to
compete while minimizing potentially significant transaction costs to ac-
quire contiguous spectrum from multiple parties, the Commission should
make large frequency blocks initially available in some portions of the
spectrum. Alternatively, the Commission could rely on simultaneous mul-
tiple round auctions, combinatorial bidding, or other mechanisms to fa-
cilitate the efficient aggregation of smaller blocks put up for bid at the
same time. Furthermore, the Commission should attempt to designate
these large blocks in frequency bands that, because of their propagation
characteristics, are most likely to be suitable for efficient offering of
broadband services. At the same time, the Commission must be aware that
its estimate of efficient spectrum use is necessarily imperfect. It also must
anticipate that technological developments will change the bandwidth nec-
essary for many types of services, permit the introduction of new services
with different bandwidth requirements, and increase the spectrum range
over which services may be efficiently provided. Therefore, the Commis-
sion should avoid defining the specific services users may offer or the spe-
cific frequencies they may utilize for such services, and it should permit
aggregation, subject to anticompetitive scrutiny, and disaggregation of
spectrum into different size blocks. In this way, the Commission can allow
izes the opportunity cost of holding the spectrum and therefore internalizes the tradeoff be-
tween providing service with today's technology and waiting to introduce service with future
technology, allowing private spectrum users to make this decision is economically efficient.
See infra text accompanying note 38.
21. As discussed below, anticompetitive withholding of service from the market is best
addressed by a spectrum cap. See infra text accompanying notes 28-29. Availability of service
to rural areas is probably best achieved through universal service subsidies rather than build-
out requirements.
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the market to correct for the imperfections inherent in the initial allocation
process, and it can ensure that allocations intended to further competition
now do not inadvertently restrict competition in the future.
The Commission should also carefully consider the appropriate rela-
tionship among exclusive licensing, shared licensing, and unlicensed use.
In most circumstances, exclusive spectrum licenses best promote effi-
ciency and competition by giving each spectrum user maximum protection
from interference. However, some uses of spectrum, particularly very low
power uses, create such small potential for interference and have so little
effect on the availability of the resource to others that they can be offered
most efficiently and most competitively without licensing spectrum users.
As a result, once the spectrum has been set aside for unlicensed use, the
efficient charge for the use is zero. However, setting aside spectrum for
unlicensed use does involve a cost-the spectrum cannot be used for high-
power services. Comparing the benefits of low-power and high-power use
is very difficult, but the Commission should endeavor to develop a frame-
work for evaluating the benefits of setting aside additional spectrum for
unlicensed use. These benefits could then be compared to the benefits of
exclusive use, as indicated by the prices paid at auction for the rights to
use spectrum with similar characteristics.
The Commission has authorized unlicensed use of very low-power
devices on a secondary basis in most bands occupied by licensed serv-
ices,22 authorized use of higher-power unlicensed communications devices
on a secondary basis in some bands,3 and designated certain blocks of
spectrum exclusively for unlicensed personal communications services
(PCS) devices. 24 The Commission should continue to consider the circum-
stances under which unlicensed uses of spectrum are appropriate, and in
particular whether technologies such as spread spectrum may increase the
potential utility of unlicensed devices. At the same time, the Commission
should be aware that unlicensed users may have less incentive to use spec-
trum efficiently.2 To address this problem in unlicensed bands, the Com-
22. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 15.201-15.214 (1996).
23. See id. §§ 15.215-15.255; Amendment of the Comm'n's Rules to Provide for Opera-
tion of Unlicensed NI Devices in the 5 GHz Frequency Range, Report and Order, 12 FCC
Rcd. 1576, 5 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1120 (1997) [hereinafter U-NIl Order].
24. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 15.301-15.323; see also Amendment of the Comm'n's Rules to Es-
tablish New Personal Comm. Serv., Second Report and Order, 8 FCC Red. 7700, paras. 79-92,
73 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1477 (1993) [hereinafter PCS Second Report and Order], reconsid-
ered and modified in part by Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. 4957, paras. 203-
44,75 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 491 (1994).
25. See DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANI-
ZATION, 121-23; TODD SANDLER, COLLECTIVE AcTION: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS, 117-23
(1992); Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE, December 13, 1968, at
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mission has adopted certain protocols, etiquettes, and power limitations.
The Commission should also consider that with expanded flexibility and
relaxation of build-out requirements, licensees may in some circumstances
find it profitable to accommodate certain low-power uses within their li-
censed spectrum through contractual agreements with manufacturers,
thereby leaving the determination of whether spectrum will be used for
26
such purposes more fully to market forces.
Another alternative to exclusive licensing is licensing two or more
parties to share a particular frequency band. The Commission must keep in
mind that licensed spectrum sharing typically requires additional regula-
tory restrictions on users' operational flexibility in order to keep them
from interfering with each other, especially where more than a very few
users are involved, or else sharing is likely to result in lower service qual-
ity. Furthermore, as with unlicensed spectrum, users under a sharing ar-
rangement generally have less incentive to use spectrum efficiently than
exclusive licensees. The Commission should carefully consider in each
case whether these costs outweigh the gains of opening the spectrum to
more licensees. The Commission also should consider whether, in most
cases, spectrum sharing can be effectuated by private arrangement between
the licensee and another party. In general, we believe that spectrum sharing
should be mandated only in rare instances where specific conditions, such
as high transaction costs, would prevent entry into efficient private ar-
rangements. Even with high transaction costs, sharing should be limited to
circumstances where the Commission possesses very good information
and a high degree of certainty about technology and future trends so that
the benefits of reducing transaction costs will outweigh the costs of in-
flexibility and poor incentives.
Promotion of competition should also be a principal consideration
motivating the establishment of rules for assigning spectrum to individual
users. In particular, the Commission should strive to reduce barriers to en-
try by eliminating restrictions on eligibility wherever possible. The Com-
mission generally should not impose eligibility restrictions unless they are
clearly necessary to prevent a party from developing or retaining market
power (i.e., the ability to control or significantly influence price).27 Fur-
1243-48 (1968); Durga P. Satapathy & Jon M. Peha, Spectrum Sharing Without Licenses: Op-
portunities and Dangers, in INTERCONNECrON AND THE INTERNET 49 (Gregory L. Rosston &
David Waterman eds., 1997).
26. For example, a licensee or group of licensees with a nationwide footprint might lease
authorizations to use spectrum to manufacturers for the operation of low-power devices with
the cost of spectrum use, like other costs, being added to the price of equipment.
27. See Alexis Jacquemin & Margaret E. Slade, Cartels, Collusion, and Horizontal
Merger, in THE HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION I, 450-66 (Richard Schmalensee and
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thermore, whenever possible the Commission should consider less restric-
tive measures than eligibility restrictions to achieve this end. For example,
allowing service flexibility across a wide range of spectrum and increasing
the supply of spectrum available to the market would reduce both the bar-
riers to entry and the need for eligibility restrictions.
At the same time, the Commission should be prepared to intervene
directly in the market when necessary to preserve or promote competitive
conditions. Market forces do not ensure economic efficiency or maximize
consumer welfare in markets that are not competitive because a dominant
producer or group of producers has market power. Thus, where market
forces and antitrust law may be insufficient to prevent any party from de-
veloping or retaining market power, the Commission should consider
measures such as spectrum caps to ensure at least a minimum number of
• 28
competitors. In applying caps, the Commission should consider the range
of spectrum available for a service as well as the availability of other tech-
nologies that do not use spectrum. For the most part, these measures will
likely be needed only in service markets that have not yet completed the
transition to full competition, as indicated by factors including the degree
of concentration, pricing patterns and trends, the extent of barriers to entry,
29and the extent to which substitutable services can be provided. Once a
market has become fully competitive, the normal operation of market
forces, supplemented by enforcement of antitrust laws, should ordinarily
suffice to prevent competitors from exercising market power or engaging
in anticompetitive activities. The Commission should consider whether
additional reporting requirements are needed to help it determine when
special measures are necessary to promote competitive conditions. In ad-
dition, increasing the number and variety of competitors in the market may
help to develop and maintain robust competition.
Robert D. Willig eds., 1990).
28. See Implementation of Sections 3(n) and 332 of the Comm. Act, Third Report and
Order, 9 FCC Rcd., 7988, paras. 238-85, 76 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 326 (1994); Amendment of
Parts 20 and 24 of the Comm'n's Rules, Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 7824, paras. 94-103,
3 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 433 (1996).
29. See, e.g., Implementation of Section 6002(B) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1993, First Report, 10 FCC Rcd. 8844, paras. 65-83, 78 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1322
(1995); Implementation of Sections 3(n) and 332 of the Comm. Act, Second Report and Or-
der, 9 FCC Rcd. 1411, paras. 250-252, 74 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 835 (1994); see also DENNIS
W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANzATION, 331-80 (1994);
Richard Schmalensee, Inter-Industry Studies of Structure and Performance, in THE HANDBOOK
OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION II, supra note 27, at 951-1010; Timothy F. Bresnahan, Empiri-
cal Studies of Industries with Market Power, in THE HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
II, supra note 27, at 1011-58.
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B. Flexibility
In order for competition to bring consumers the highest valued serv-
ices in the most efficient manner, we believe competing users of spectrum
need flexibility to respond to market forces and demands. This flexibility
includes the freedom to determine how they will use spectrum, how much
spectrum they need, and the geographic area in which they will provide
service. Flexibility eliminates artificial market entry barriers by enabling
spectrum users to respond quickly to changing public demands for new
and different services, as well as enabling users to introduce innovative
services and technologies rapidly without administrative costs or delays.
Furthermore, flexibility increases users' incentives to expand spectrum ca-
pacity by enabling them to profit from investments in more efficient use of
spectrum, either by using spectrum for additional purposes or by transfer-
ring the authorization to use part of the spectrum to a party that values it
more highly. Flexibility also can promote competition by increasing both
the diversity of potential service offerings and the number of providers that
can offer competing services.30 In general, flexibility endows a spectrum
license with certain attributes resembling private property rights, including
the ability to transfer control with Commission approval, freedom to de-
termine how the property will be used (subject to applicable technical re-
quirements), and freedom to profit from use of the resource. As discussed
above, the Commission legally cannot award perpetual or absolute owner-
ship rights to spectrum.3' However, substantial replication of the freedoms
inherent in property rights in the spectrum context will allow competition
to function more effectively, much as it does in those sectors of the econ-
omy where the basic inputs are privately owned.32
We therefore believe that the Commission's policies should strive to
maximize spectrum users' flexibility in four dimensions. First, users
should have substantial service flexibility-the freedom to use spectrum
for services of their choosing. In several recent proceedings the Commis-
sion has acted to permit licensees extensive service flexibility in new
30. See generally WILLIAM J. BAUMOL Er AL., CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY
OF INDUSTRY STRUCrURE (1982); Richard J. Gilbert, Mobility Barriers and the Value of In-
cumbency, in THE HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION I, supra note 27, at 475-536.
31. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
32. See Douglas W. Webbink, Radio Licenses and Frequency Spectrum Use Property
Rights, COMM. & THE LAW 4 (1987); Ronald H. Coase, The Federal Communications Com-
mission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1959); Louis De Alessi, The Economics of Property Rights: A Re-
view of the Evidence, in 2 RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 1, 3-12 (Richard 0. Zerbe Jr. ed.,
1980); Jora R. Minasian, Property Rights in Radiation: An Alternative Approach to Radio
Frequency Allocation, 18 J.L. & ECON. 221 (1975).
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services, such as PCS and general wireless communications service.33
Similarly, the Commission has taken action to increase service flexibility
in existing services. For example, the Commission has created additional
flexibility for mobile services licensees to offer fixed services.3 In general,
this trend should continue, but some incumbent service providers may urge
the Commission to limit flexibility in order to reduce competition for their
services. Limiting the public benefits from newly available spectrum to
protect the private interests of existing licensees does not promote the
public interest. Although the Commission is required by statute to estab-
lish certain regulatory classifications, within those classifications the
Commission has substantial leeway regarding the amount of flexibility it
can afford. Maximum service flexibility will enable spectrum users
quickly and efficiently to modify their offerings to provide the services
that consumers demand and that technology makes possible.
Second, technical flexibility means that users should have broad
freedom to choose the technologies and equipment that they will use to
provide services. 35 Technical flexibility gives spectrum users the ability
and incentive to develop and implement innovative, spectrum-efficient,
low-cost, and consumer-responsive technologies for delivering their serv-
ices without unnecessary delay or regulatory interference. In addition,
technical flexibility will give different licensees the ability to try different
technologies and to compete on the basis of their technologies. For exam-
ple, some personal communications services providers believe that code
division multiple access (CDMA) will be the best technology for their
service, whereas others favor time division multiple access (TDMA) or the
Groupe Speciale Mobile (GSM) standard. The competition between the
different technologies as well as the competition between different systems
should lead to innovation and new services for consumers.
33. See, e.g., PCS Second Report and Order, 8 FCC Rcd. 7700, paras. 19-24, 73 Rad.
Reg. 2d (P & F) 1477 (1993); Allocation of Spectrum Below 5 GHz Transferred from Fed.
Gov't Use, Second Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 624, paras. 6-28, 78 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F)
1173 (1995). The Commission's policy permitting broad service flexibility in PCS was widely
praised by many of the participants in the en banc hearing. See, e.g., Transcript, supra note 10,
at 31-33 (statement of Tom Hazlett), 149 (statement of Charles Jackson, Strategic Policy Re-
search).
34. See Amendment of the Comm'n's Rules To Permit Flexible Serv. Offerings, First Re-
port and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11 FCC Rcd. 8965, 3 Comm.
Reg. (P & F) 1190 (1996).
35. See, e.g., U-NIl Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 1576, para. 61, 5 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1120
(1997); PCS Second Report and Order, 8 FCC Rcd. para. 23, 73 Rad. Reg. 2d 1477; A Re-
Examination of Tech. Regs., Report and Order, 99 F.C.C.2d 903, 57 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 391
(1984) [hereinafter Technical Regs. Report and Order]. We note that the Commission should
continue, in conjunction with other government agencies, to ensure that users comply with ap-
propriate health and safety standards.
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Third, users should have flexibility to determine both the amount of
spectrum they occupy and the geographic area they serve. As discussed
above, when the Commission issues an initial license it must define that
license, at a minimum, in terms of both spectrum block size and geo-
graphic area.36 Once initial licenses have been assigned, however, licensees
should ordinarily be free to disaggregate their spectrum and partition their
service areas in order to operate within the parameters that they determine
to be efficient.37 Similarly, in those instances where the Commission's ini-
tial assignments are relatively constrained with respect to bandwidth or
geographic scope, licensees should generally be able to aggregate addi-
tional authorizations in order to provide the services demanded by the
marketplace. As a general rule, flexibility of scope should be limited only
as necessary to promote specific procompetitive goals, or to preserve other
specific public interest requirements. For example, where limits on aggre-
gation of spectrum may appear necessary to prevent a party from devel-
oping or maintaining market power, the Commission should first consider
increasing the supply of spectrum usable for a service, and impose spec-
trum caps only where it is impossible to create competition through addi-
tional spectrum.
Fourth, licensees should have implementation flexibility. To the ex-
tent it can legally do so, the Commission should generally eliminate re-
quirements for licensees to build out their networks within a specified pe-
riod of time. By permitting licensees to allow spectrum to remain unused
where it is economically efficient to do so, the Commission can make it
possible for market forces to govern the rate at which spectrum is devel-
oped, and eliminate the need to rely on administrative judgment regarding
when spectrum should be released.3 ' Furthermore, spectrum flexibility, in-
cluding the flexibility to transfer authorization to use spectrum, will cause
licensees to bear the full opportunity cost of allowing spectrum to remain
idle. In addition, flexibility will allow additional licensees freely to enter
any market, and therefore will reduce the ability of licensees that are al-
ready in a market to withhold spectrum for anticompetitive purposes.
In most instances, service and technical flexibility should be limited
36. See supra Part TII.B.
37. See, e.g., Geographic Partitioning and Spectrum Disaggregation by Commercial Mo-
bile Radio Servs. Licensees, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
11 FCC Rcd. 21,831 (1996). In comments filed in connection with the en banc hearing, AT&T
Wireless stated that it had been approached by local companies seeking to build out limited
rural areas of AT&T's PCS territories before AT&T was able to reach those areas, but it was
unable to accommodate those requests under the Commission's rules then in effect. Comments,
supra note 10, Wayne M. Perry, AT&T Wireless Services, Inc., at 4.
38. See supra text accompanying notes 20-21.
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only by rules to prevent interference.39 An authorization to use spectrum is
of limited value without an expectation that one's legitimate use of the
spectrum will be free from interference by others. Thus, each user of spec-
trum, like a user of land or any other resource, must sacrifice some degree
of unrestricted use so that every other user can enjoy the benefits of spec-
trum utilization within that user's own defined bounds. The Commission
should continue to define the extent to which each spectrum user may ex-
pect freedom from interference and enforce rules to protect those expecta-
tions. 4° The Commission can and should, however, perform this function in
a manner that is minimally intrusive upon users' flexibility. Thus, rules to
limit interference should ordinarily be output-based (e.g., limitations on
emissions outside the licensed spectrum band and geographic area or
sharing criteria) rather than input-based (e.g., specifying permissible serv-
ices or technologies).4 1 So long as a spectrum user's emissions comply
with objective numerical standards, it should ordinarily be free to offer any
services by using any technologies it wishes. The Commission should also
consider expanding spectrum users' flexibility to negotiate among them-
selves interference limitations that may differ from those specified in the
rules. 42
Although we believe the Commission should generally attempt to
minimize limitations on technical flexibility, it should consider whether,
under narrow circumstances, its specification of technical standards may
promote the effective operation of the market. In most cases, we believe
that if a common standard is economically efficient for a product or serv-
ice, market forces will lead producers to adopt the optimal common stan-
dard voluntarily. Under some circumstances, however, the market may fail
to quickly produce a common standard because individual producers have
interests in particular standards that are different from the public interest.
3
39. But see infra Part mI.C. (discussing appropriate public interest limitations on flexibil-
ity).
40. See, e.g., Technical Regs. Report and Order, 99 F.C.C.2d 903, paras. 10-13, 57 Rad.
Reg. 2d (P & F) 391 (1984). We note that under some circumstances, this definition may con-
sist of a determination that particular users will enjoy little or no freedom from interference.
See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 15.5(b) (1996) (unlicensed devices must accept interference).
41. See Technical Flexibility in the Mobile Comm. Servs., Notice of Inquiry and Pro-
posed Rulemaking, 101 F.C.C.2d 331 (1985); Technical Regs. Report and Order, 99 F.C.C.2d
903, paras. 10-12, 27, 57 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 391 (1984).
42. See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 22.912(b) (Cellular licensees may negotiate service area bound-
ary extensions with adjacent licensees.); id. § 24.237(d) (Operational fixed service licensees
may agree to accept interference from broadband PCS licensees greater than that specified in
rules.); see also Transcript, supra note 10, at 184-85 (statement of Peter Pitsch, Progress and
Freedom Foundation), 192 (statement of Charla Rath, Freedom Technologies, Inc.); but see
Comments, supra note 10, Lynn Claudy, National Association of Broadcasters, at 12-13.
43. See Stanley M. Besen & Garth Saloner, The Economics of Telecommunications Stan-
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While it may be appropriate for the Commission to intervene under such
limited circumstances, it should do so sparingly because prescribed techni-
cal standards can have substantial drawbacks. For example, the Commis-
sion may have difficulty selecting the most efficient standard, and any
standard it selects may discourage or even prevent future innovation that
would benefit the public. In addition, the process of formulating a single
technical standard can seriously delay introduction of a service. Thus, the
Commission should evaluate the circumstances in each case carefully so as
not to unnecessarily override the market's natural response mechanisms.
44
Where a single standard is necessary, the Commission should encourage
agreement on a standard, and it should preserve as much flexibility within
the standard as is possible.45 Furthermore, the Commission should actively
explore sunsetting any technical standards once the market has developed
to the point where they are no longer necessary.
C. Public Interest and Market Failure Considerations
Although competition ordinarily is the most effective means of en-
suring the production of a socially optimal mix of goods and services in an
economically efficient manner, under some circumstances market forces
will fail to produce outputs that maximize social welfare. For example, as
discussed above, markets do not function effectively where a dominant
producer has substantial market power.46 Market failure also may occur
when the production or consumption of an output exhibits significant ex-
ternalities, that is, costs or benefits that consumers or producers are unable
dards, in CHANGING THE RULES: TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE, INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION, AND
REGULATION IN COMMUNICATIONS 177 (Robert W. Crandall & Kenneth Flamm eds., 1989);
Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, 8 J. ECON. PERSP.
93 (1994); Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Installed Base and Compatibility: Innovation,
Product Preannouncements, and Predation, 76 AM. ECON. REv. 940 (1986); JEAN TIROLE,
THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, 404-09 (1992); Stanley M. Besen & Joseph Far-
rell, Choosing How to Compete: Strategies and Tactics in Standardization, 8 J. ECON. PERSP.
117 (1994); STANLEY M. BESEN & LELAND L. JOHNSON, COMPATIBILITY STANDARDS,
COMPETITION AND INNOVATION IN THE BROADCASTING INDUSTRY (1986).
44. In this regard, it has been proposed that governmental intervention to set standards
may be appropriate only for a new service that is worthy of national investment, and not for an
extension of an existing service. See Comments, supra note 10, John Stupka, SBC Communi-
cations, Inc., at 4-5; Transcript, supra note 10, at 160-61, 201 (statement of John Stupka, SBC
Communications, Inc.); see also Technical Regs. Report and Order, 99 F.C.C.2d 903, paras.
27-28, 57 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 391 (1984). Although we reach no conclusion here regarding
the extent to which this guideline may be universally applicable, it is illustrative of the type of
factors the Commission may wish to consider in deciding whether to intervene in the setting of
standards in any particular case.
45. See Advanced TV Syst. and Their Impact, Fourth Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd.
17,771, 5 Comm. Reg. 963 (1996).
46. See supra text accompanying notes 27-28.
Number 1]
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
fully to incorporate into their decision-making processes.47
The market also may fail to yield socially efficient output of public
goods. Public goods are products or services that individuals can consume
without purchasing (nonexcludability) and without detracting from other
consumers' opportunities to benefit from the same unit of the good
(nonrivalry in consumption).48 The marketplace typically underproduces
public goods because, lacking the power to exclude, producers are unable
to collect a charge from every consumer of the good.49 Many users of
spectrum provide services that exhibit attributes of public goods. For ex-
ample, national defense, public safety services, and basic scientific re-
search are public goods that are often provided or funded by governmental
units for the benefit of the public as a whole. It should be clear, however,
that although the services provided in these cases are public goods, the in-
puts to these services are not public goods. Spectrum, like cars and radios,
is an input to the provision of public safety.
The public interest is best served when public and private enterprises
produce economically efficient types and quantities of public goods. In the
case of some public goods that use radio spectrum, such as national de-
fense and some public safety services, the Commission and the executive
branch have agreed upon allocations of spectrum for federal government
use to produce these outputs.5 For other public goods, however, the Com-
mission must consider how best to promote the public interest by ensuring
that efficient quantities of the goods are produced. Some have argued that
the best way to achieve this end is for the public to allocate direct financial
subsidies to producers of public goods, who will use that money to com-
pete for spectrum on the open market in the same way they compete for
most other inputs. 1 Others argue, however, that for historical and political
reasons this approach may often be impractical and that spectrum should
52be reserved for such entities. We note in this regard that the Public Safety
47. See JAMES MITCHELL HENDERSON & RICHARD E. QUANDT, MICROECONOMIC THEORY
296-307 (1980); JOSEPH E. STIGLriz, ECONOMICS OFTHE PUBLIC SECTOR 178-97 (1986).
48. See Steven T. Call & William L. Holahan, MICROECONOMICS, 455-56 (1983);
SANDLER, supra note 25, at 5-6; STIGLrIZ, supra note 47, at 99-119.
49. Even if producers can exclude some consumers, it may be inefficient for them to do so
because each additional user imposes no significant additional cost.
50. See 47 C.F.R. § 2.106 (1996); see also 47 U.S.C. § 305 (1994), amended by 47
U.S.C.A. § 305 (West Supp. 1997). Other bands are designated exclusively for nonfederal
governmental use, and still other bands are shared between federal and other users. We note
that where spectrum is shared between federal and nonfederal users, that fact may limit the
technical flexibility allowable to users who are subject to the Commission's jurisdiction.
51. See Transcript, supra note 10, at 34 (statement of Tom Hazlett), 165-66 (statement of
Peter Pitsch).
52. See, e.g., Comments, supra note 10, Susan Mayer, MCI Communications Corp., at 2-
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Wireless Advisory Committee Report identifies access to spectrum as well
as funding and increased access to commercial services as inputs that are
needed to maintain and improve public safety.5 3 However, to ensure that
the public gets the maximum benefit from the spectrum, in considering the
reservation of spectrum for any service, the Commission should balance
the value of spectrum in that service against its value for other uses. In
general, explicit financial subsidies are preferable to set-asides because
they are more narrowly targeted and their costs can be more easily evalu-
ated. By contrast, it is difficult to determine the cost of reserving spectrum,
and set-asides create disincentives for the adoption of possibly efficient
tradeoffs between equipment and spectrum. Options such as redirecting
some portion of auction revenues for public safety might prove to be a
more efficient subsidy mechanism than set-asides because public safety
agencies would realize the opportunity cost of their spectrum usage and
make more efficient choices.
To the extent the Commission desires to take into consideration other
public interest goals in allocating or assigning licenses and is unable to use
explicit monetary subsidies as discussed above, it should do so by clearly
stating the obligations on the license upfront and allowing the licensee
flexibility in meeting those obligations. Licensees should be allowed to
meet the obligations themselves, or to contract with others to meet the ob-
ligations for them in order to minimize the inefficiency of the obligations.
Furthermore, any intervention should be narrowly tailored to the goal it is
intended to promote, and the Commission should in every instance balance
the public interest in intervention against the costs of interfering with
competitive market forces.
Public interest concerns also may require some limitations on service
or technical flexibility. The Communications Act and related statutes, for
example, contain provisions that create specific public interest obligations
for broadcasters, including the obligation to allow reasonable access to the
broadcast airwaves by legally qualified candidates for federal elective of-
fice,5 the obligation to provide "equal opportunities" to legally qualified
3, Michael Amarosa, Association of Public Safety Communications Officials, Inc., at 2-4,
Henry Geller, at 3-4, Lynn D. Claudy, National Association of Broadcasters, at 8-9, Jonathan
D. Blake, Association for Maximum Service Television, at 16-18; Transcript, supra note 10, at
54-56 (statement of Philip Verveer, Public Safety Wireless Advisory Committee), 61-62
(statement of Peter Murray), 115-16 (statement of John Battin, Motorola Inc.), 189 (statement
of Charles Jackson), 219 (statement of Wayne Perry, AT&T Wireless Services, Inc.).
53. Public Safety Wireless Advisory Committee Report, §§ 2.3-2.6.
54. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652 § 312(a)(7), 48 Stat. 1064, 1086-87 (codified at
47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7)(1994)).
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candidates for public office,55 the prohibition against charging legally
qualified candidates for public office more than the "lowest unit charge"
during a certain period prior to an election,56 and the obligation to air edu-
cational and informational programs for children.5 7 Similarly, providers of
direct broadcast satellite (DBS) service are required to reserve capacity for
noncommercial educational and informational programming and make it
available to national educational programming suppliers at reasonable
rates.5 s The Commission has also proposed similar rules for digital audio
radio service.59 Some service rules may be needed to further the public in-
terest in universal access to telecommunications services at just, reason-
able, and affordable rates,60 as well as services that are accessible to per-
61
sons with disabilities. Some technical limitations may also be necessary
in the interest of public health, safety, and environmental protection, in-
• • 62
cluding limitations on radio frequency emissions and rules requiring
service providers to offer interoperable emergency services. As with rules
intended to prevent interference, 6' however, it should be possible to
achieve these ends in a manner that is minimally restrictive of users' flexi-
bility, in large part by focusing on outcomes rather than means. For exam-
ple, the Commission has required certain commercial mobile radio service
providers to offer enhanced 911 services meeting defined performance
criteria by specific dates, but it preserved flexibility by avoiding specifica-
tion of the technology they must use.64 The Commission's Report and Or-
der regarding children's educational television similarly preserved broad-
casters' flexibility in meeting their statutory obligation while providing
55. Id. § 315(a); 47 C.F.R. § 73.1941(1996).
56. 47 U.S.C. § 315(b)(1); 47 C.F.R. § 73.1942.
57. 47 U.S.C.A. § 303(a)-(c) (West Supp. 1997); 47 C.F.R. § 73.671.
58. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 335(b).
59. See Establishment of Rules and Policies for the Digital Audio Radio Satellite Serv.,
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11 FCC Rcd. 1, paras. 27-28, 6 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 2151
(1995).
60. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 254; see also Comments, supra note 10, Wayne M. Perry, AT&T
Wireless Services, Inc., at 5.
61. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 255; see also Implementation of Section 255 of the Telecomm. Act
of 1996, Notice ofInquiry, 11 FCC Rcd. 19,152 (1996).
62. See, e.g., Guidelines for Evaluating the Envtl. Effects of Radiofrequency Radiation,
Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 15,123, 3 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1092 (1996), modified by
Second Memorandum Opinion and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, WT Docket
No. 97-192 (FCC Aug. 25, 1997).
63. See supra text accompanying notes 40-42.
64. See Revision of the Comm'n's Rules To Ensure Compatibility with Enhanced 911
Emergency Calling Syst., Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11
FCC Rcd. 18,676, 3 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 967 (1996), comment period extended by Order, 11
FCC Rcd. 22,355 (1996); see also Technical Regs. Report and Order, 99 F.C.C.2d 903, para.
27, 57 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 391 (1984).
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clear guidance as to what will be considered satisfactory performance.6
D. Licensing and Fee Policies
In order for the public to derive the maximum benefit from spectrum
use, authorizations to use spectrum should be assigned in a manner that
minimizes delay and inefficiency. When the Commission receives mutu-
ally exclusive applications for initial spectrum usage authorizations, com-
petitive bidding is the most effective means of promoting this end.66 Com-
petitive bidding serves the public interest in several ways. First, a well
designed competitive bidding approach is better able to get spectrum into
the hands of those who initially value it most highly and to facilitate effi-
cient spectrum aggregation than fragmented secondary markets. The auc-
tion process ensures that an authorization to use spectrum will be initially
awarded to the party that places the highest value on the spectrum and
therefore is willing to pay a market price for it.67 Although secondary mar-
kets are useful to reassign spectrum as its value to different parties changes
over time, relying on efficient auctions in the first instance reduces costs
and delay in the initial assignment process. Second, users who are not re-
quired to pay market value may have an incentive to acquire licenses on a
speculative basis simply to resell these licenses, thereby wasting valuable
resources in rent-seeking. Indeed, this occurred on a widespread basis
when the Commission awarded cellular licenses by lottery.6' Although the
Commission should not attenpt to prevent authorized spectrum users from
selling their authorizations for a profit, it better serves the public interest to
require the party that is initially authorized to use spectrum to pay the
value of that authorization to the public, rather than getting it for free sim-
65. See Policies and Rules Concerning Children's TV Prog., Report and Order, 11 FCC
Rcd. 10,660,3 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1385 (1996).
66. Until recently, the Commission had the legal authority to use competitive bidding only
where the expectation was that service would be provided to subscribers. See 47 U.S.C.A. §
309(j)(1)-(2) (West Supp. 1997). However, Congress recently extended the Commission's
authority to all mutually exclusive applications for initial licenses or construction permits, ex-
cept for public safety services, digital television service licenses given to existing terrestrial
broadcast licenses, and noncommercial educational and public broadcast stations. See Balanced
Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, sec. 3002(a)(1)(A), 111 Stat. 258-59 (amending 47
U.S.C.A. § 309(j)).
67. See Implementation of Section 309(j) of the Comm. Act-Competitive Bidding, Sec-
ond Report and Order, 9 FCC Rd. 2348, paras. 5, 70, 75 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1 (1994),
modified by Second Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9 FCC Rd. 7245, 75 Rad. Reg. 2d (P
& F) 1178 (1994).
68. See John McMillan, Why Auction the Spectrum? 19 TELECOMM. PoLIcy 191 (1995);
Gregory L. Rosston, The Effects of FCC Regulation on Land Mobile Radio (1994)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University) (on file with authors); Kvnmtm &
FELKEP, supra note 11.
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ply because it is lucky enough to win a lottery. Third, auctions vastly re-
duce the delay involved in both resolving mutually exclusive applications
for initial licenses and in getting those licenses into the hands of those who
value them most highly, as compared to lotteries or comparative hear-
. 69
ings. The Commission's successful experience in conducting auctions
confirms our evaluation that competitive bidding is ordinarily the preferred
means for awarding initial authorizations from among mutually exclusiveS • 70
applications.
In some instances, however, competitive bidding is not an appropri-
ate means for assigning spectrum use authorizations. First, auctions are not
necessary in the absence of mutually exclusive applications because, if
there is only one applicant, then there are no opportunity costs associated
with granting a license to the sole applicant. Auctions also are not cur-
rently authorized under limited circumstances, including the licensing of
public safety radio services and noncommercial educational broadcast sta-
tions.71 Furthermore, auctions may be problematic for services that have
large economies of scope or scale and need to be provided on a transna-
tional basis to realize those economies. In theory there is no reason that li-
censes for such services could not be awarded by competitive bidding, but
there may be practical difficulties involved in conducting competitive bid-
ding for transnational services. For example, it may be difficult for a single
provider to obtain a set of complementary licenses from different coun-
tries, even though the licenses are most valuable as a set, if competitive
bidding occurs in a sequence of auctions. The licensing process would also
be delayed if an international organization would have to be formed or
designated to coordinate or conduct a simultaneous auction.72 However,
69. See Improving Comm'n Processes, Notice of Inquiry, 11 FCC Rcd. 14,006, para. 11
(1996) [hereinafter Commission Processes NO1]; Comments, supra note 9, Henry Geller, at 2-
3; Peter K. Pitsch, Progress and Freedom Foundation, at 7-8.
70. Since the Commission received auction authority from Congress in 1993, it has suc-
cessfully conducted several auctions that have raised more than $20 billion for the United
States Treasury. As has been noted, however:
One of the greatest myths about the spectrum auctions is that the [amount]
raised was the most important aspect of the process .... In monetary terms, the
most important effect [of the auctions] to the economy is that... PCS license
winners are now investing in the infrastructure that will permit them to offer
wireless communications service in competition with each other and other pro-
viders such as cable and telephone companies.
Hundt & Rosston, supra note 11, at 40.
71. See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, sec. 3002(a)(1)(A) (amending 47 U.S.C.A. §
3090)(2)).
72. Some have also argued that other services should not be auctioned. See, e.g., Com-
ments, supra note 10, Mark E. Crosby, Industrial Telecommunications Association, at 4-5
(arguing that auctions should not be used for private wireless systems); Transcript, supra note
10, at 112-13 (statement of Paul Baran) (arguing that auctions should not be used where a large
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these concerns should not foreclose the possible use of auctions. Rather,
they should be considered in comparing auctions to available alternatives,
including the current process.73
If Congress so authorizes, the Commission may collect fees for
spectrum use. In general, the Commission should consider assessing fees
that approximate the market value of spectrum where such fees will help to
promote the economically efficient use of spectrum. For example, user
fees for shared frequencies in the private land mobile radio services may
help to alleviate a "tragedy of the commons" situation, in which use of the
spectrum may become congested and users have little incentive to use that
resource more efficiently because any privately initiated attempt to im-
prove efficiency would confer benefits on all users of the shared spectrum,
with only a fraction of these benefits accruing to the party undertaking the
effort. 74 Where no such circumstances are present, however, the Commis-
sion should not assess user fees in a misguided effort to obtain revenue.75
In general, user fees are appropriate only under limited circumstances
where the spectrum user does not realize the opportunity cost of the use of
spectrum. With exclusive use, flexibility, and the ability to transfer li-
censes, users realize the opportunity cost of using spectrum, and thus fees
should not be charged. Where these conditions do not obtain, the Commis-
sion should consider whether restrictions on the license could be relaxed so
that the user does realize the opportunity cost, rather than simply imposing
fees.
In addition to using competitive bidding, the Commission should
continue to take other actions to expedite the assignment of licenses. Thus,
the Commission and its staff have reduced delays by automating and oth-
erwise streamlining many licensing processes. For example, the Wireless
number of small service providers are operating in an unproven market because large up-front
payments would discourage innovation). For the reasons discussed above, we believe propo-
nents of such exceptions should bear the burden of overcoming a strong presumption in favor
of using competitive bidding where legally authorized.
73. In addition, the Commission must consider whether under current law it retains the
legal authority to use methods other than competitive bidding under such circumstances.
See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, sec. 3002(a)(1)(A) (amending 47 U.S.C.A. § 3090)(1)).
74. See supra text accompanying notes 25-26; Replacement of Part 90 by Part 88 to Re-
vise the Private Land Mobile Radio Services, Report and Order and Further Notice of Pro-
posed Rulemaking, 10 FCC Red. 10,076, paras. 136-38, 78 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 384 (1995),
modified by Memorandum Opinion and Order, 11 FCC Red. 17,676, 5 Comm. Reg. (P & F)
999 (1996).
75. User fees, which are intended to recover from the user the market value of spectrum,
are to be distinguished from application fees, which are fixed by statute, and regulatory fees,
which the Commission is mandated to collect in order to recover its own costs. See 47
U.S.C.A. §§ 158, 159. Assessment of appropriate application and regulatory fees is generally
both economically sensible and legally required.
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Telecommunications Bureau has implemented "auto-granting" and elec-
tronic filing of authorizations for many services, and the International Bu-
reau has reduced processing time for unopposed uncontroversial interna-
tional section 214 applications to under thirty days after the public notice
and comment period.76 Similarly, the Commission has expedited the avail-
ability of service by relying on private spectrum coordinators in many
cases. 77 The Commission should continue exploring additional initiatives
along these lines.
The Commission also should strive to ensure that its licensing and
fee policies accommodate the needs of all businesses. An increasingly
market-based spectrum policy may require new tools to meet the goal of
ensuring that small businesses are given the opportunity to participate inS 78
the provision of spectrum-based services. Some attributes of a more
competitive, demand-driven spectrum market will advance this goal. For
example, the availability of larger amounts of spectrum and the grant of
greater flexibility will reduce the scarcity value of spectrum, lowering its
price and making it more affordable for small businesses. Eliminating use
restrictions will encourage firms to allow others access to their spectrum
for noninterfering uses. Small firms, who are often the proponents of new
technologies, will not have to go through the expensive, time-consuming,
and uncertain process of gaining Commission approval for a proposed use
and then securing the allocation of spectrum for this use.
Flexibility in the scope of licenses, through rules permitting disag-
gregation of spectrum and partitioning of geographic area licenses, will
make it easier for small businesses to acquire licenses suitable for their
business plans and thus will serve as one method of eliminating market
entry barriers. The availability of spectrum in the secondary market also
can work to the competitive advantage of small firms since they do not
have to reveal their technology and business plans to their competitors. On
the other hand, as the Commission increasingly utilizes more market-based
assignment mechanisms and allows licensees greater flexibility, small
businesses may have difficulty obtaining information about and accessing
spectrum or otherwise satisfying their communications needs. To mitigate
these possible consequences to small businesses, the Commission should
consider taking steps to facilitate small business access to information
76. See generally Commission Processes NOI, 11 FCC Rcd. 14,006 (1996).
77. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 332(b) (authorizing the Commission to utilize assistance furnished
by advisory committees in coordinating the assignment of frequencies in the private mobile
and fixed services); see also 47 C.F.R. § 90.175 (1996).
78. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 309(j)(4)(D); see also id. § 257 (directing Commission to identify
and eliminate market entry barriers for small businesses).
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about available spectrum and spectrum-based services.
E. Administrative Certainty
An effectively functioning competitive market includes elements of
both certainty and uncertainty. The very essence of competition is uncer-
tainty of outcomes; competitive markets reward efficiency-enhancing be-
havior, but success is not guaranteed. In order to function effectively,
however, a competitive market needs clear and firm regulations. If spec-
trum users and their financial supporters are not reasonably certain of the
rules that will govern spectrum use, they will be less willing to invest in
obtaining and developing the spectrum. For example, entrepreneurs likely
will bid and invest greater amounts in spectrum if they know in advance
that the use will be flexible and they are confident that it will remain that
way. In the absence of such certainty, the spectrum may not be used to its
full potential and the public may fail to realize its full value.
For this reason, the Commission's spectrum policies should promote
administrative certainty. Thus, before a use of spectrum is authorized or a
service is initiated, the Commission should establish the rules affecting
that use with as much certainty as is reasonable. For example, the Com-
mission should set out in advance the interference rules, the full range of
flexibility allowed, requirements concerning accommodation of preexist-
ing users of the spectrum, and any other matters affecting the rights and
obligations of licensees. Because of the value of flexibility, licensees
regularly appeal to the Commission to increase flexibility after the award
of their licenses, thereby generating opposition on equity grounds that
might not have arisen if flexibility had been granted before the licenses
were assigned. In order to avoid such debates, and to maximize efficiency
in the initial award of licenses, the Commission should award maximum
flexibility initially.
The principle of administrative certainty also affects many of the
Commission's policies after initial authorization of a service. For example,
a desire to provide certainty underlies the policy that licensees ordinarily
have an expectancy of renewal when their license terms expire. Although
the Commission awards licenses for fixed terms, due to the high renewal
expectancy these licenses in many ways resemble de facto licenses in per-
petuity. This policy encourages efficient investment in assets tied to a spe-
cific license because license holders retain the benefits of these invest-
ments.79 Without confidence in their long-term rights, licensees would tend
to underinvest in license-specific assets, especially as the end of the license
79. Other license arrangements may also lead to efficient investment.
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period approached.
Furthermore, the Commission should exercise its jurisdiction to re-
allocate spectrum and change the rules governing use of spectrum with due
regard for the reasonable expectations of incumbent licensees. No incum-
bent has a legitimate expectation of freedom from competition, but incum-
bents do expect that they will be able to continue using spectrum that they
have been assigned without additional or unexpected interference, or major
new service and technical restrictions. Although in some instances the
public interest will require the Commission to act notwithstanding these
expectations, it should do so only where necessary to promote clearly es-
tablished public interest goals. Moreover, when it is necessary in the pub-
lic interest to reallocate spectrum, the Commission should make every ef-
fort to ensure efficient and fair compensation for spectrum incumbents
who are required to move. In general, the Commission should consider
"overlay"80 assignments, with the right to move incumbents if provided
with equivalent replacement assets or service, as a method of ensuring that
spectrum incumbents will be fairly and efficiently compensated for the
value of their investments. Such efforts are not only a matter of common
equity, but in the long run will encourage efficient investment by promot-
ing certainty among spectrum users regarding the security of their invest-
ments.
F. The Global Marketplace
Finally, all of the Commission' s spectrum policy decisions should re-
flect the international context in which spectrum usage occurs. Radio
waves do not stop at national borders. Therefore, domestic policies must
take into account the spectrum policies of other nations. The United
States's spectrum policies should, among other things, support global sys-
tems and seamless international networks, in both satellite and terrestrial
operations, where such systems promote the public interest. Consumers
benefit from being able to communicate easily with persons in other na-
tions and to move equipment readily between nations. For example, a
global satellite system customer, or a customer of a system that is part of a
worldwide seamless network, could use one transceiver in multiple nations
to receive and send voice, video, or data service. At the same time, the ef-
fort to achieve worldwide seamless networks may exact costs, which the
80. An "overlay" is a second assignment of already licensed spectrum, pursuant to
which the overlay licensee must secure the original licensee's agreement either to vacate the
spectrum or to accept interference before it may begin operations. See, e.g., Transcript, su-
pra note 10, at 150-51 (statement of Peter Pitsch). But see id. at 186-88 (statement of Char-
les Jackson) (noting potential difficulties with overlay assignments in some circumstances).
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Commission should balance against the benefits.
It may be particularly important to coordinate the policies of the
United States and other nations for satellite systems, which may serve
multiple nations from the same satellite platform. Satellite systems in the
future are increasingly likely to be global or regional systems. The new
nongeostationary systems have constellations of satellites that move rela-
tive to the Earth. User transceivers are capable of communicating with
these satellites and transferring calls to other satellites as they come into
view. Constellations of nongeostationary satellites are capable of provid-
ing services anywhere in the world. In order to be profitable, these con-
stellations need adequate, spectrum in which to operate. Therefore, the
Commission should promote measures to achieve efficient use of spectrum
worldwide, including efforts to revise international administrative proce-S 81
dures that may create artificial orbit spectrum scarcity. For example, the
Commission may need to develop spectrum policies for the entry of for-
eign-owned satellite systems into the United States market. This is likely
to require additional exchange of information with other nations to discuss
harmonization of policies, including spectrum allocations for such sys-
tems.
United States consumers and producers can also potentially benefit
from the development of worldwide seamless networks. Roaming agree-
ments that permit customers of personal wireless services to make and re-
ceive phone calls easily while away from their home nations, and agree-
ments that facilitate free circulation of communications equipment
between nations, such as mutual recognition agreements for the type ap-
proval of terminals, can contribute to the development of such networks. In
addition, policies that promote use of the same spectrum for the same
services around the world may facilitate the development of global sys-
tems and seamless networks by eliminating the need for equipment that
can operate on multiple frequency bands, as well as for protocols to con-
vert international communications from one frequency to another. Fur-
thermore, consistency in spectrum allocations among different countries
may produce economies of scale for equipment manufacturers, thereby re-
ducing prices for consumers. However, a system of worldwide spectrum
block allocations has costs as well as benefits. As discussed above, restric-
tions on how licensees may use spectrum may prevent licensees from put-
ting spectrum to its highest valued uses and from quickly introducing in-
81. See, e.g., International Telecommunication Union Resolution 18, Kyoto (1994)
(review of the ITU's Frequency Coordination and Planning Framework for Satellite Net-
works).
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novative services and technologies. Moreover, to the extent that govern-
ment policy limits uses of spectrum and requires specific technologies, the
market will be unable to test whether the benefits of worldwide seamless
networks exceed the costs.
We therefore believe that the Commission should pursue policies that
facilitate the development of worldwide seamless networks without pre-
cluding other uses and technologies. This end can be achieved by promot-
ing policies that reduce the transaction costs, both in the United States and
abroad, of participating in worldwide seamless networks. Specifically, the
United States should support spectrum allocations in the International
Telecommunication Union, domestically, and in other countries that would
allow the same equipment to operate worldwide but would allow other
uses as well. The Commission should also establish licensing band plans
featuring spectrum blocks and service areas that are consistent with, or
could be made consistent with, worldwide systems, such as facilitating ag-
gregation of spectrum blocks and geographic areas in the licensing process
where appropriate and permitting aggregation and disaggregation in the
after market. If the Commission determines that the highest value of some
frequency band is likely to be for a particular worldwide system, it should
optimize the initial band plan for that system, but it should not foreclose
other uses of that spectrum or prevent the market from reconfiguring the
spectrum. We believe that such policies, which minimize the transaction
costs for the market to configure the spectrum in the most economically
efficient manner, will best balance the benefits of worldwide seamless
networks and the benefits of flexibility.
Spectrum policy in the United States should be part of an interna-
tional framework that facilitates the emergence of new technologies. In
general, governments cannot reliably predict what innovative uses private
companies will develop that require spectrum licenses, and these unpre-
dicted, creative uses can contribute greatly to the development of global
communications and a world economy. In the United States's experience,
competition and flexibility promote innovation. Therefore, in addition to
promoting competition and flexible spectrum use domestically, the United
States should seek to encourage competitive markets and the creation of a
flexible environment for spectrum worldwide.
Finally, global spectrum policies, like global wireline telecommuni-
cations policies, should seek to extend connectivity to citizens around the
world. Intergovernmental satellite organizations such as INTELSAT and
Inmarsat have been instrumental in bringing communications to the devel-
82. See supra Part III.B.
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oping world and ensuring that all nations are interconnected to the global
public switched network. As private nongeostationary and geostationary
satellite systems are licensed, and the natures of INTELSAT and Inmarsat
change, it is important that the United States's and global policy support
expansion of competitive communications in developing nations.
In order to accomplish these goals, the United States must continue to
take an active leadership role in international forums. This requires con-
siderable coordination of domestic and international policies and priorities.
Effective international spectrum management requires that the United
States enter into various commitments with foreign governments, includ-
ing multilateral agreements governing satellite communications and
agreements with our immediate neighbors governing terrestrial spectrum
usage.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article proposes a policy framework under which the Commis-
sion would generally rely on competitive market forces and allow spec-
trum users maximum flexibility to respond to the market in order to
achieve usage of spectrum that is of the greatest value to the public. This
framework would continue and expand upon the initiatives that the Com-
mission has already taken in these directions. We believe that the Commis-
sion's consideration of these principles as guidelines will help lead it to
decisions that best serve the American people.
These principles imply a different and less activist role for the Com-
mission than under other potential spectrum policy paradigms. Nonethe-
less, this Article identifies several crucial functions that the Commission
should continue to perform in order for competitive market forces to work
most effectively. First, the Commission should actively seek out instances
in which spectrum is currently allocated or its use restricted in a manner
that prevents it from being used to its full value, and it should remedy
those situations. Second, when making spectrum initially available for a
new service or use, the Commission should establish initial geographic ar-
eas and frequency blocks that reflect its best estimate of the most efficient
uses of spectrum so as to reduce the need for immediate secondary market
transactions. Third, the Commission should set and enforce minimally re-
strictive baseline rules governing interference and health effects. Fourth,
the Commission should seek to maximize the amount of spectrum avail-
able to users. Fifth, the Commission should monitor the market and un-
dertake targeted intervention to correct for significant market failures,
when necessary, to ensure competitive conditions, or advance important
public interest goals. Sixth, the Commission should act when appropriate
to further the efficient use of spectrum in the public interest in the interna-
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tional context. Finally, in determining whether to undertake any interven-
tion, the Commission should balance the benefits of intervention against
the value of administrative certainty. We recommend that the Commission
carefully consider whether, by following these principles, it will further its
ultimate goal: the use of spectrum in the public interest.
